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ABSTRACT 
 
Adequate credit availability for small businesses is an important public policy issue because small businesses 
are essential for employment and economic growth for the economy. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 
1999 includes a provision that could potentially support financial institutions in the provision of credit to 
small businesses through the use of advances from the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system that are 
secured with small business loans. We explore the relation between FHLB advances to financial institutions 
and the provision of loans to small businesses. We find a positive link between the change in FHLB 
advances and the change in small business loans and the level of FHLB advances and the level of small 
business loans. This relation holds for large and small banks and pre- and post-2007 recession. However, 
we find that the change in the proportion of small business loans to assets is only positively related to the 
change in the advances to assets ratio prior to the recessionary period. This suggests that banks substitute 
small business loans for other types of assets during relatively normal economic periods, but FHLB 
advances are a source of wholesale funds that will be invested in the most attractive financial assets available 
with no preference for any particular asset during periods of contracting credit.  
 
Keywords:  Federal Home Loan Bank, Advances, Small Business Lending, Small Business Credit 
JEL Codes: G21, G28 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, commonly known as the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, included a provision that permitted community financial 
institutions to borrow from the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system and use small 
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business and small agricultural loans as collateral1 (Craig and Thomson 2003).  Prior to 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, only mortgage loans and, to some extent, other real estate 
loans were eligible as collateral for FHLB advances (Craig and Thomson 2003).  
Historically, FHLB advances were intended to provide funding for housing (Flannery 
and Frame 2006).  Congressional motivation for this tweak of policy is not clear but one 
reasonable interpretation is that congress intended to provide support for increased 
lending to small businesses and small farms.    
Regardless of the legislation’s intent, it is clear from the FHLB website that 
community lending is now important to the system (www.fhlbanks.com).  After more 
than a decade and a significant recession, the importance of small businesses as creators 
of jobs remains an important policy consideration2.   The creators of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act did not foresee all of the events of the first decade of the 21st century but the 
decision to provide funding for small businesses through the FHLB system, a 
government-sponsored enterprise, is probably more relevant today than ever.  The FHLB 
system is a large financial entity with total assets over one trillion dollars at its peak in 
2008 (Office of Finance of the Federal Home Loan Banks 2008) and a significant 
capacity to provide funding to financial institutions for small business loans.   An 
important policy issue and the focus of this investigation is the nature of the relation 
between FHLB system advances to financial institutions and the credit extended to small 
businesses by financial institutions.   In other words, do commercial banks use funds 
borrowed from the FHLB system to make loans to small businesses? 
The FHLB system is composed of 12 regional Federal Home Loan Banks.  All 
regional FHLBs sponsor some form of Community Investment Cash Advance (CICA) 
program.  Table 1 displays these and other similar programs.  Although the names and 
specific terms vary by regional FHLB, all CICA programs are meant to provide member 
institutions with reduced cost advances for the purpose of increasing certain types of 
                                                 
 
 
1 Nearly all commercial banks are permitted to join and subsequently borrow from the FHLB.  Only 
community financial institutions, defined to have assets under $500 million in 1999 dollars, are able to 
use small business loans as collateral for advances.  See Stojanovic et al. (2008) for a more detailed 
discussion. 
2 Berger and Udell (1998) provide a description of the relationship of small businesses to the economy and 
the importance of small businesses. They also describe the process and some of the problems associated 
with financing small businesses. 
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community lending.  At each regional FHLB, small business loans qualify as community 
lending, meaning members can make use of these programs to obtain lower cost advances 
if the funds are used for small business loans.  Many regional FHLBs have additional 
programs that promote small business lending.  For example, the Dallas and Pittsburg 
FHLBs administer programs that provide grant funding to small businesses that have 
borrowed from FHLB member institutions (called the Economic Development Program 
Plus and the Banking on Business program respectively).  The Topeka FHLB operates 
the Joint Opportunity for Building Success program that provides grant funding to 
member institutions for the purpose of community job creation.  All of these programs, 
if successful, should decrease the cost of and increase the amount of funding available to 
small business. 
 
Figure 1. Aggregate Small Business Lending 
The sum of all small business loans outstanding is graphed for each year.  The sample consists of an unbalanced panel 
of 106,062 firm year observations taken from the June 30th bank level Reports of Condition and Income from 2001 
to 2014.  Dollar amounts on the horizontal axis are in billions of dollars. 
 
 
Our research is unique and adds to the evolving literature on the FHLB system 
in the following ways.  First, we are the only investigation that uses a large panel of data 
to investigate the link between FHLB advances and small business loans provided by 
commercial and savings banks.  Only one other study by Tuccillo, Flick, and Ranville 
(2005) investigates this relation and they use cross-sectional data for 2003.  Second, our 
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Table 1. Regional Federal Home Loan Bank Small Business Lending Programs 
Each of the individual regional Federal Home Loan Banks is permitted to develop their own programs to promote 
community lending.  Below is a list of programs that are partially or solely used to promote small business loans. 
 
Regional FHLB Program Name Details of Program 
Atlanta Economic Development 
Plan 
Advances are priced 10 basis points below normal advance rates to provide 
funding for projects and business in moderate income communities. 
Boston Community Development 
Advance 
Provides discounted funding for small business or personal lending for 
borrowers in locations at or below 115% (100%) of area median income 
for rural (urban) areas. 
Chicago Community Investment 
Cash Advance 
Provides discounted lending for a variety of loans, including small 
business loans. 
Cincinnati Community Investment 
Cash Advance 
Provides discounted advances for low income housing or economic 
development, including small business loans. 
Dallas Economic Development 
Program 
Provides favorably prices advances to fund economic development. 
 Economic Development 
Program Plus (EDPPlus) 
Provides grants of up to $25,000 to qualifying small businesses that have 
borrowed from FHLB member institutions. 
Des Moines Community Investment 
Cash Advance 
Provides funding to members at cost to fund projects, including small 
business loans. 
 Community Lending 
Advance 
Provides low cost funding for commercial and agricultural lending. 
Indianapolis Community Investment 
Program 
Provides favorably-priced funds for community economic development in 
low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. 
New York Community Lending 
Program for Small Business 
Lending 
Provides less expensive advances for small business lending. 
 Rural Development 
Advance 
Provides low priced advances for individuals with less than 115% of area 
median income in areas with a population less than 25,000. 
 Urban Development 
Advance 
Provides low priced advances for individuals with less than 100% of area 
median income in areas with a population greater than 25,000. 
Pittsburgh Community Lending 
Program 
Provides advances 20 – 40 basis points below normal advances rates for 
community and economic development. 
 Banking on Business (BOB) Provides recoverable grants for startup funding to small businesses that 
must be combined with small business loans.  BOB funding recovery is 
made based on the health of the small business and has the following 
repayment terms: 0% interest and no principal repayment in year 1, 3% 
interest (retained by the member) and principal repayment begin in year 
2, and 6% interest (with 3% retained by the member and 3% by the 
FHLB) in year 3 forward. 
San Francisco Advances for Community 
Enterprise 
Provides low priced advances for the purpose of community lending. 
Seattle Economic Development 
Fund 
Provides reduced rate advances to support economic development. 
Topeka Community Development 
Program 
Provides low cost funding for community development.   
 Joint Opportunity for 
Building Success 
Provides grants to promote economic initiatives that promote community 
employment growth. 
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data set is recent and covers the time period 2001-2014.  This allows us to examine the 
effect of advances during the financial crisis in which small business lending was reduced, 
as documented by Cole (2012) and shown in Figure 1.  The reduced lending that resulted 
from the 2007 recession made support for small business lending imperative.  If advances 
from the FHLB are indeed being used by banks for small business loans, it is particularly 
important that this relation holds during times of reduced liquidity and contracting 
credit.  We find that FHLB advances are being used to fund small business loans by both 
large and small banks and both pre- and post-2007 recession, but banks only shift their 
asset portfolios to more heavily favor small business loans before the 2007 recession. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes previous research that is 
relevant to the present investigation and Section III presents the hypotheses tested.  
Section IV explains the sample, data, and statistical method.  Section V presents the 
results of the statistical tests of the hypotheses, and the last section develops the 
implications of the results. 
 
II. Literature Review 
Very few empirical investigations have explored the effects of FHLB advances on 
commercial bank performance.  This is somewhat surprising given the size, scope, and 
potential influence of the FHLB system.  Ashcraft, Bech, and Frame (2009) refer to the 
FHLB system as “a large, complex, and understudied U. S. Government-sponsored 
enterprise (GSE) that was created in the midst of the Great Depression.”  The FHLB 
system consists of twelve cooperatively owned “banks” which provide secured loans called 
advances to over 8,000 member institutions, including commercial banks, thrifts, credit 
unions, and insurance companies (Ashcraft, Bech, and Frame 2009).  The ability to inject 
approximately one trillion dollars in funding into the banking system offers the 
possibility for a major impact on the economy. 
Ashcraft, Bech, and Frame (2009) investigate the relationship between changes 
in FHLB advances at the institution level and changes in other balance sheet changes 
during the second half of 2007.  For a period of six quarters before 2007 that they 
considered normal, they find there is a strong correlation between changes in FHLB 
advances and changes in both mortgage loans and non-mortgage loans for small 
institutions but a much weaker relationship for large institutions (Ashcraft, Bech, and 
Frame 2009).  Ashcraft, Bech, and Frame (2009) find that small banks and thrifts 
probably use FHLB advances to smooth out changes in funding during the normal 
period while larger institutions are less dependent on FHLB advances to meet funding 
Davidson & Simpson  FHLB Advances and Small Business Lending 
 
6 
needs.  However, in the third quarter of 2007 many of the relationships changed.  Larger 
institutions began to use FHLB advances more.  The correlation between FHLB 
advances and mortgage loans for small institutions increased some during the third 
quarter of 2007, but the relation for large institutions increased significantly.  The 
positive correlation between changes in FHLB advances and changes in non-mortgage 
loans became larger in the third quarter of 2007 for small institutions but became much 
weaker to the point of turning negative for larger institutions.  The aforementioned 
relationships in the Ashcraft, Bech, and Frame (2009) investigation returned to the pre-
crisis baseline in the fourth quarter of 2007.  Ashcraft, Bech, and Frame (2009) conclude 
that FHLB advances are used to smooth one time liquidity imbalances but the 
willingness of institutions to lend, not funding pressure, normally is the binding 
constraint on the origination of new loans.   
Frame, Hancock, and Passmore (2007) find that FHLB advances are just as likely 
to be used for non-mortgage loans as mortgage loans for single-family housing.  They 
also find that FHLB advances are used to meet unexpected credit requests due to changes 
in loan demand but mortgages are not unique in this respect (Frame, Hancock, and 
Passmore 2007).  Furthermore, Frame, Hancock, and Passmore (2007) conclude that 
FHLB advances are probably not stabilizing financing for housing, and financial 
institutions appear to be using FHLB advances as a wholesale funding source to fund all 
types of commercial bank assets, not just mortgages.  Frame, Hancock, and Passmore 
(2007) refer to the idea that FHLB advances are just part of a pool of funds that are not 
linked to any particular type of assets as the “wholesale funding view” of FHLB advance 
usage.  According to this view, we would not expect to see FHLB advances tied to a 
particular type of loan such as small business loans.  
Tuccillo, Flick, and Ranville (2005) find that single-family mortgage loans and 
multifamily mortgage loans are positively correlated with the amount of FHLB advances.  
However, they do not find a positive correlation between FHLB advances and other 
loans, which includes agricultural loans, small business loans, construction loans, and 
land development loans, unless the size of the financial institution is considered.  Their 
results indicate a positive relationship between FHLB advances and other loans for 
institutions with assets less than $1 billion but no relationship for larger institutions 
(Tuccillo, Flick, and Ranville 2005).  Institution size does not affect the relationship 
between FHLB advances and either single-family mortgage loans or multifamily 
mortgage loans (Tuccillo, Flick, and Ranville 2005).  Tuccillo, Flick, and Ranville (2005) 
conclude that FHLB advances translate into more credit for housing, small businesses, 
and agriculture in the economy and the communities served by financial institutions.   
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Craig and Thomson (2003) explore the relationship between bank deposits and 
small business loans with a panel of data from 1993 through 1999.  Their analysis 
addresses the existence of funding constraints in small loan markets prior to the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act that were hypothesized to be the source of a market failure causing the 
need for the subsidy of FHLB advances.  Craig and Thomson (2003) find that 
community banks in rural areas have more funds available than they can loan to their 
relationship borrowers, which argues against a funding constraint.  Furthermore, Craig 
and Thomson (2003) find that increases in the demand for small business loans and 
agricultural loans are easily met by the community banks shifting more liquid assets into 
these types of loans.  They conclude that the extension of FHLB advances secured with 
small business and small farm loans is unlikely to increase the amount of loans to small 
businesses and small farms.   
The relationship of primary interest for this analysis is the link between FHLB 
advances and loans to small businesses.  Ashcraft, Bech, and Frame (2009) report some 
evidence of a positive link between FHLB advances and small business loans that is 
strongly influenced by the size of the financial institution and general economic 
conditions.  However, Ashcraft, Bech, and Frame (2009) ultimately conclude that the 
willingness of institutions to lend is the binding constraint on new loans, not lack of 
funding.  Frame, Hancock, and Passmore (2007) conclude that financial institutions 
view FHLB advances as fungible and simply include advances in a general pool of funds 
that is not directed to any one type of asset.  This view suggests that FHLB advances do 
not necessarily produce increased loans to small businesses.  Craig and Thomson (2003) 
come to a similar conclusion because they find no evidence of a funding constraint on 
financial institutions and banks seem to simply liquidate more liquid assets when loan 
demand increases.  Tuccillo, Flick, and Ranville (2005) provide evidence of a link 
between FHLB advances and small business loans.  They conclude that FHLB advances 
increase loans to small businesses for small financial institutions with assets less than one 
billion dollars but there is no evidence of a link for larger financial institutions. 
 
III. Hypotheses 
Craig and Thomson (2003) argue that small businesses rely heavily on small 
community banks to provide the financing for their operations.  They base their 
argument on the work of Peterson and Ranjan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) that 
suggests the importance of relationship lending by small community banks for small 
business financing.  Craig and Thomson (2003) further argue that if community banks 
Davidson & Simpson  FHLB Advances and Small Business Lending 
 
8 
are constrained for funds in their local markets, then the availability of additional funding 
through FHLB advances will result in increased funding for small businesses because 
small business loans can be used as the required collateral for FHLB advances. However, 
if financial institutions are not funding constrained, Craig and Thomson (2003) argue 
that it is not certain if financial institutions will direct advances into loans to small 
businesses or not. Financial institutions may simply view FHLB advances as another 
source of funding and direct the funds to the best available asset that may not be a small 
business loan.  Based on their evidence that community banks are not funding 
constrained, Craig and Thomson (2003) conclude that there is no reason to believe that 
FHLB advances will be used specifically to generate small business loans.   
However, Craig and Thomson (2003) argue that since small business loans may 
be used as collateral towards advances, community financial institutions may increase 
their issuance of these types of loans even if they are not funding constrained.  The reason 
for a bank to specifically direct advances towards these asset types is to increase the types 
of assets that may be used as collateral against new advances.  Stojanovic et al. (2008) 
describe issuing qualified loans to permit increased access to advances as maintaining an 
option on advances.  A bank wishing to grow could use advances to make mortgage loans, 
small business loans, or agricultural production loans and then secure additional advances 
by posting the newly made loans as collateral.  In this case, advances would alter the 
portfolio make-up of banks by changing the amount of mortgage or community lending.  
Assuming that neither bank asset size nor asset composition is fixed, Craig and Thomson 
(2003) contend that the collateralization option is likely to induce community financial 
institutions to increase their holdings of all types of assets, with an increasing share of 
total assets invested in small business loans.   
Given the FHLB’s focus on community economic development and the 
associated reduced-cost advances, we posit that this line of reasoning suggested by Craig 
and Thomson (2003) is the correct description of reality.  We predict that the ability of 
financial institutions to use small business loans as collateral for FHLB advances will 
cause financial institutions to increase the volume of small business loans, an asset growth 
effect in the terminology of Craig and Thomson (2003), and the proportion of small 
business loans in an institution’s portfolio of assets, a portfolio substitution effect in the 
terminology of Craig and Thomson (2003).  Our hypotheses in the alternative form are: 
 
Asset Growth Hypothesis (H1a): The volume of FHLB advances is 
positively related to the volume of small business loans for a financial 
institution. 
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Portfolio Substitution Hypothesis (H2a): The proportion of FHLB advances 
to total assets is positively related to the proportion of small business loans 
to total assets for a financial institution. 
 
IV. Implications 
A. Data and Sample 
Data from bank level Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports) available 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago from 2001 to 2010 and from FFIEC Central 
Data Repository's Public Data Distribution site from 2011 to 2014 is employed in the 
statistical analysis.  The sample is composed of yearly data from 2001 to 2014 because 
FHLB advances were not recorded on Call Reports until 2001, and small business loans 
are only available once per year in the June 30 Call Report until 2010.  All sample banks 
have a minimum of $1 million in assets, $500,000 in core deposits, and $750,000 in 
loans.  These restrictions are imposed to remove data reporting errors and banks that are 
no longer able to operate.  Adding these restrictions reduces the number of bank-year 
observations from 107,924 to 106,062. 
Table 2 contains summary statistics.  The number of banks in the sample 
decreases from 8,595 in 2001 to 6,598 in 2014.  Panel A displays statistics for the entire 
sample.  Construction of all variables is detailed in Table A1.  Banks have $75 million 
small business loans outstanding and have $43 million in advances from the FHLB on 
average.  We follow Cole (2012) and define small business loans as the sum of 
commercial and industrial loans (C&I) and commercial real estate loans (CRE) with 
original amounts less than $1 million unless substantially all of C&I and CRE have 
original amounts less than $100,000.  In this case, we define small business loans to be 
the sum of C&I and CRE.  Average bank size is $1.43 billion while $424 million of 
assets are liquid.  Liquid assets are composed of the sum of cash and balances due from 
depository institutions, Federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to 
resell, securities held until maturity, and securities available for sale.  Assets are funded 
with an average of $149 million in equity and $246 million in core deposits which are 
the sum of deposits from transaction accounts and time deposits less than $100,000.  
Non-performing loans and leases (sum of loans and leases 90 days past due, nonaccrual 
loans and leases, and other real estate owned) average almost $15 million compared to 
$265 million in outstanding mortgage loans, business loan commitments of $287 
million, and total credit of $2.3 billion.  Mortgage loans are the sum of all loans backed  
Davidson & Simpson  FHLB Advances and Small Business Lending 
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by residential property and total credit is the sum of total assets and total commitments.  
Average bank net income in the sample is $6.8 million.  We winsorize the percent change 
in small business loans and the percent change in FHLB advances at -1 and +1.   
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 106,062 firm year observations taken from the June 30th bank level 
Reports of Condition and Income from 2001 to 2014.  All dollar amounts are in thousands.  SBL is small business 
loans.  FHLB is Federal Home Loan Bank advances.  TA is total assets.  Equity is total equity capital.  NPL is non-
performing loans and leases.  B Commitments is business commitments and T Commitments is total commitments.  TC 
is total credit.  Mortgages is mortgage loans.  The construction of all variables is defined in Table A1.  PC(∙) is the 
percentage change from year t-1 to year t.  Δ(∙) is the change from year t-1 to year t.  Ln(∙) is the natural logarithm.  
Panels B and C contain mean values, standard errors, and the test statistic of the difference in means for large vs. small 
banks and banks with above vs. below average FHLB advances to total assets respectively.  Small Banks are defined to 
have less than or equal to $1 billion in total assets.  Asterisks indicate statistical significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), 
and 0.10 (*) levels. 
Panel A: Full Sample      
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Dollar Amounts 
SBL 75,391 583,306 0 36,700,000 
FHLB  43,460 667,970 0 87,700,000 
TA 1,428,825 27,100,000 2,298 2,000,000,000 
Equity 149,208 2,644,789 -161,976 183,000,000 
NPL 14,764 502,605 0 65,500,000 
Net Income 6,810 132,579 -3,238,426 10,200,000 
Liquid Assets 423,941 8,820,556 0 788,000,000 
Core Deposits 246,239 3,159,663 520 237,000,000 
B Commitments 287,466 6,400,287 0 660,000,000 
T Commitments 854,420 18,900,000 0 1,510,000,000 
TC 2,283,237 41,300,000 2,298 2,880,000,000 
Mortgages 265,338 5,214,978 0 386,000,000 
Variables of Primary Interest 
PC(SBL) 0.0479 0.2555 -1 1 
Δ(SBL/TA) -0.0011 0.0468 -0.6307 0.7633 
Ln(SBL) 9.7238 1.6916 0 17.4188 
PC(FHLB) -0.1050 0.4288 -1 1 
Δ(FHLB/TA) 0.0002 0.0273 -0.4286 0.4200 
Ln(FHLB) 9.0656 1.7370 0 18.2896 
Control Variables 
SBL/TA 0.1559 0.1051 0 0.9784 
FHLB/TA 0.0372 0.0539 0 0.6413 
Equity/TA 0.1107 0.0500 -0.1175 0.9580 
NPL/TA 0.0140 0.0236 0 0.4889 
Net Income/TA 0.0040 0.0074 -0.3858 0.2340 
Liquid Assets/TA 0.3212 0.1609 0 0.9911 
Core Deposits/TA 0.4434 0.1421 0.00004 0.9294 
B Commitments/TC 0.0723 0.0549 0 0.9638 
Mortgages/TA 0.1963 0.1344 0 0.9776 
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 Panel B: Large vs. Small Banks 
Variable                              Large                       Small  
 Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Difference 
Dollar Amounts 
SBL 675,516 24,162 29,496 110 646,020*** 
FHLB  497,295 28,181 8,522 62 488,772*** 
TA 17,500,000 1,141,023 183,028 600 17,300,000*** 
Equity 1,830,808 111,197 18,968 68 1,811,840*** 
NPL 169,515 21,519 2,850 25 166,664*** 
Net Income 84,825 5,586 768 7 84,057*** 
Liquid Assets 5,198,387 372,498 54,161 204 5,144,226*** 
Core Deposits 2,487,628 132,294 72,644 212 2,414,984*** 
B Commitments 3,781,950 270,272 16,855 97 3,765,096*** 
T Commitments 11,400,000 797,211 35,485 3821 11,400,000*** 
TC 28,900,000 1,735,277 218,512 3888 28,700,000*** 
Mortgages 3,212,588 221,343 38,449 173 3,174,139*** 
Variables of Primary Interest 
PC(SBL) 11.2682 10.6111 0.3906 0.0351 10.8776 
Δ(SBL/TA) -0.0047 0.0003 -0.0008 0.0002 -0.0039*** 
Ln(SBL) 12.3269 0.0174 9.5268 0.0049 2.8001*** 
PC(FHLB) 4.1346 1.0023 0.8439 0.2416 3.2906*** 
Δ(FHLB/TA) -0.0013 0.0004 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0016*** 
Ln(FHLB) 11.7300 0.0239 8.7719 0.0062 2.9581*** 
Control Variables 
SBL/TA 0.0988 0.0008 0.1602 0.0003 -0.0615*** 
FHLB/TA 0.0565 0.0008 0.0357 0.0002 0.0208*** 
Equity/TA 0.1076 0.0006 0.1109 0.0002 -0.0033*** 
NPL/TA 0.0152 0.0003 0.0139 0.0001 0.0013*** 
Net Income/TA 0.0046 0.0001 0.0039 0.00002 0.0007*** 
Liquid Assets/TA 0.2827 0.0018 0.3242 0.0005 -0.0415*** 
Core Deposits/TA 0.2413 0.0014 0.4591 0.0004 -0.2178*** 
B Commitments/TC 0.1053 0.0008 0.0698 0.0002 0.0356*** 
Mortgages/TA 0.2017 0.0016 0.1959 0.0004 0.0058*** 
  
The average percent change in small business loans is nearly 5%, the average change in 
the small business loans to total assets ratio is -0.0011, and the natural logarithm of small 
business loans averages 9.7.  The percent change in FHLB advances averages -0.105, the 
average change in the advances to total assets ratio is 0.0002, and the natural logarithm 
of advances averages 9.  Not shown in Table 2, the sample includes 6,484 bank-year 
observations of De Novo banks defined to have been in operation for less than five years. 
Table 2 Panel B displays summary statistics for large vs. small banks.  Large banks 
are defined to have greater than $1 billion in total assets.  The large bank sample has a 
larger natural logarithm of small business loans, but has a smaller change in the small 
business loans to total assets ratio, and there is no difference between the average percent  
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 Panel C: Banks with Above vs. Below Average Advances to Assets 
Variable                             Above Average                               Below Average  
 Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Difference 
Dollar Amounts 
SBL 85,091 1,993 70,087 2,551 15,004*** 
FHLB  95,507 4,634 15,051 1,906 80,456*** 
TA 1,046,266 64,222 1,638,134 123,762 -591,869*** 
Equity 109,421 6,047 170,976 12,120 -61,555*** 
NPL 11,045 483 16,793 2,372 -5,748** 
Net Income 4,252 270 8,210 612 -3,958*** 
Liquid Assets 254,970 16,423 516,390 40,924 -16,423*** 
Core Deposits 226,466 6,525 257,057 14,579 -30,592* 
B Commitments 173,774 18,738 349,669 28,622 -175,895*** 
T Commitments 337,303 48,532 1,137,344 85,876 - 800,041*** 
TC 1,383,559 101,340 2,775,478 188,221 -1,391,919*** 
Mortgages 256,489 12,929 270,168 23,737 - 13,679 
Variables of Primary Interest 
PC(SBL) 0.2735 0.0344 1.6919 1.2052 -1.4184 
Δ(SBL/TA) -0.0020 0.0002 -0.0006 0.0002 -0.0015*** 
Ln(SBL) 10.2165 0.0075 9.4518 0.0067 0.7647*** 
PC(FHLB) 1.0417   0.2206 1.3850 0.4949 -0.3432 
Δ(FHLB/TA) 0.0070 0.0002 -0.0036 0.0001 0.0106*** 
Ln(FHLB) 9.7613 0.0073 7.9261 0.0106 1.8352*** 
Control Variables 
SBL/TA 0.1643 0.0005 0.1512 0.0004 0.0131*** 
FHLB/TA 0.0942 0.0003 0.0061 0.00004 0.0881*** 
Equity/TA 0.0997 0.0002 0.1167 0.0002 -0.0170*** 
NPL/TA 0.0152 0.0001 0.0133 0.0001 0.0019*** 
Net Income/TA 0.0039 0.00003 0.0040 0.00003 -0.00002 
Liquid Assets/TA 0.2663 0.0007 0.3513 0.0006 -0.0850*** 
Core Deposits/TA 0.4052 0.0007 0.4644 0.0006 -0.0592*** 
B Commitments/TC 0.0774 0.0003 0.0695 0.0002 0.0078*** 
Mortgages/TA 0.2308 0.0007 0.1775 0.0005 0.0532*** 
  
change in small business loans for large vs. small banks.  The large bank sample has a 
larger average natural logarithm of FHLB advances and a larger average percent change 
of advances.  The average change in the advances to asset ratio is negative for the large 
bank sample, but positive for the small bank sample implying large banks are becoming 
less reliant on advances as a source of funding while small banks are becoming more 
reliant on advances during the sample period.   
Summary statistics for banks with above vs. below average FHLB advances to 
total assets are display in Panel C of Table 2.  Banks that fund a higher percent of assets 
with advances lend more to small businesses (SBL and Ln(SBL)) and small business loans 
compose a larger percent of assets at these banks which preliminarily suggests a positive 
relation between advances and small business loans.  However, the sample of banks with 
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above average advances to assets has a more negative change in small business loans to 
assets ratio and there is no difference between the percent change in small business loans 
between banks with above and below average advances to assets, on average.   
B. Statistical Method 
We investigate the effect of FHLB advances on small business lending with a 
series of regressions that contain year and bank fixed-effects and standard errors clustered 
at the bank level that take the following form: 
 SBLi, t=β0+β1FHLBi, t+ ∑ βkControlk, i, t-1 + ∑ βt𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 + ∑ βi 𝐵𝐵𝑌𝑌𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 + εi, t      (1) 
 
where SBL is one of three measures of small business loans following Cole (2012).  The 
first measure is the percent change in the dollar value of small business loans (PC(SBL)) 
at bank i from year t-1 to year t as measured by Berger and Udell (2004).  The second 
measure is the change in the ratio of small business loans to total assets (Δ(SBL/TA)) at 
bank i from year t-1 to year t as measured by Peek and Rosengren (1998).  The final 
measure is the natural logarithm of small business loans (Ln(SBL)) at bank i in year t. 
The independent variable of primary interest is FHLB advances which is 
measured in the same manner as small business loans in each regression (PC(FHLB), 
Δ(FHLB/TA), and Ln(FHLB)).  Other independent variables include a vector of control 
variables (control) and time (year) and bank (bank) fixed-effects.  All control variables 
are lagged one year relative to SBL.  We follow Cole (2012) and control for capital 
adequacy with total equity (Equity/TA), asset quality with nonperforming loans and 
leases (NPL/TA), earnings with net income (Net Income/TA), and liquidity with liquid 
assets (Liquid Assets/TA), each scaled by total assets.  Also following Cole (2012), we 
include the core deposits to total assets ratio (Core Deposits/TA), the ratio of business 
loan commitments to total credit (B Commitments/TC), bank size measured by the 
natural logarithm of total assets (Ln(TA)), and a dummy variable equal to one if a bank 
has been in operation for less than five years (De Novo).  Finally, we include the ratio of 
mortgage loans to total assets (Mortgages/TA).  FHLB advances have traditionally been 
given to financial institutions to promote mortgage lending so it is important to control 
for the amount of mortgage lending to prevent a spurious correlation in the regressions.   
We use the percentage change in small business loans (PC(SBL)) and the natural 
logarithm of small business loans (Ln(SBL)) to investigate the relation between the 
amount of advances outstanding and the amount of small business loans to addresses 
Davidson & Simpson  FHLB Advances and Small Business Lending 
4 
14 
whether banks are using FHLB advances to increase small business lending (Asset 
Growth Hypothesis).  The change in the small business loans to assets ratio 
((Δ(SBL/TA))  is used to examine whether banks are changing the proportion of these 
assets in their asset portfolio (Portfolio Substitution Hypothesis).  In all specifications, a 
positive coefficient on the FHLB advances variable is interpreted as support for the 
respective hypothesis.       
V. Results 
The results of estimating Eq. (1) are presented in Table 3.  Column (1) shows 
that the percentage change in FHLB advances is positively related to the percentage 
change in small business lending.  This supports the asset growth hypothesis that the 
ability of financial institutions to use small business loans as collateral for FHLB advances 
causes an increase in small business loans.  The percentage change in small business 
lending is positively related to net income, business commitments to total credit, and the 
indicator variable for De Novo banks and is negatively related to the proportion of assets 
composed of small business loans, nonperforming loans, liquid assets, and bank size.   
Column (2) displays the results of using the change in the small business loans 
to assets ratio.  Contrary to the portfolio substitution effect hypothesis, the change in the 
proportion of assets funded with FHLB advances is not related to the change in the 
proportion of small business loans in the asset portfolio.  We do not find evidence that 
banks are using advances to increase small business lending relative to other assets.  The 
change in the proportion of assets composed of small business loans is positively related 
to the business commitments to total credit ratio and the indicator for De Novo banks 
and is negatively related to the small business loans to assets ratio, nonperforming loans, 
net income, liquid assets, bank size, and mortgage loans.   
Table 3 Column (3) shows that the natural logarithm of small business loans is 
positively related to the natural logarithm of FHLB advances which supports the asset 
growth hypothesis.  Banks that borrow more from the FHLB, lend more to small 
businesses.  We also find that the natural logarithm of small business loans is positively 
related to the small business loans to assets ratio, equity capital, the business 
commitments to total credit ratio, bank size, and the De Novo indicator variable and is 
negatively related to nonperforming loans, net income, liquid assets, and mortgage loans. 
We split the sample by size and re-estimate Eq. (1) because previous work by Craig and 
Thomson (2003), Peterson and Ranjan (1994), and Berger and Udell (1995) suggests 
the relation between advances and small business lending should be stronger for small 
banks and because of the documented difference in the operations of small and large  
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Table 3. FHLB Advances and Small Business Lending  
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 106,062 firm year observations taken from the June 30th bank level 
Reports of Condition and Income from 2001 to 2014.  All estimates are obtained from fixed-effects regressions of Eq. 
(1) with standard errors clustered at the bank level.  The dependent variable is the percent change in small business 
loans (PCSBL), the change in the small business loans to total assets ratio (Δ(SBL/TA)), and the natural logarithm of 
small business loans (Ln(SBL)) in columns (1), (2), and (3) respectively.  The primary independent variable of interest 
is the percent change in FHLB advances (PC(FHLB)), the change in the advances to total assets ratio (Δ(FHLB/TA)), 
and the natural logarithm of advances (Ln(FHLB)) in columns (1), (2), and (3) respectively.  All control variables are 
lagged one year.  Control variables scaled by total assets include: total equity (Equity/TA), nonperforming loans and 
leases (NPL/TA), net income (Net Income/TA), liquid assets (Liquid Assets/TA), core deposits (Core Deposits/TA), and 
mortgage loans (Mortgages/TA).  Other control variables include: the ratio of business loan commitments to total credit 
(B Commitments/TC), the natural logarithm of total assets (Ln(TA)), and a dummy variable equal to one if a bank has 
been in operation for less than five years (De Novo).  The construction of all variables is defined in Table A1.  
Coefficients for the constant term and year and bank dummy variables are not displayed to conserve space.  P-values 
are displayed in brackets below the coefficients.  Asterisks indicate statistical significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 
0.10 (*) levels.  An F-Test confirms the overall validity of the model at better than the 1% level in each specification. 
 
Explanatory Variables Dependent Variable 
 
     (1)  
PC(SBL) 
      (2) 
Δ(SBL/TA) 
    (3) 
Ln(SBL) 
PC(FHLB) 0.0386*** 
[<0.001] 
  
Δ(FHLB/TA)  0.0055 
[0.382] 
 
Ln(FHLB)   0.0290*** 
[<0.001] 
SBL/TA -1.6950*** 
[<0.001] 
-0.4811*** 
[<0.001] 
3.1159*** 
[<0.001] 
Equity/TA -0.0469 
[0.636] 
-0.0138 
[0.102] 
0.4307*** 
[<0.001] 
NPL/TA -1.6827*** 
[<0.001] 
-0.1449*** 
[<0.001] 
-2.4338*** 
[<0.001] 
Net Income/TA 1.0719*** 
[0.002] 
-0.2495*** 
[<0.001] 
-2.0212*** 
[0.004] 
Liquid Assets/TA -0.1263*** 
[<0.001] 
-0.0185*** 
[<0.001] 
-0.4754*** 
[<0.001] 
Core Deposits/TA -0.0169 
[0.397] 
-0.0018 
[0.565] 
0.0226 
[0.516] 
B Commitments/TC 0.3427*** 
[<0.001] 
0.0133* 
[0.065] 
0.4419*** 
[<0.001] 
Ln(TA) -0.1650*** 
[<0.001] 
-0.0142*** 
[<0.001] 
0.6434*** 
[<0.001] 
Mortgages/TA -0.0081 
[0.849] 
-0.0247*** 
[<0.001] 
-0.1830** 
[0.049] 
De Novo 0.0843*** 
[<0.001] 
0.0095*** 
[<0.001] 
0.0234* 
[0.055] 
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banks (Berger et al., 2005).  Large banks are defined to have greater than $1 billion in 
total assets, and small banks have less than or equal to $1 billion in assets.  Table 4 shows 
that the relation between FHLB advances and small business lending is qualitatively the 
same for both large and small institutions.  The positive relation between advances and 
small business loans in columns (1), (3), (4), and (6) support the asset growth hypothesis.  
The change in the proportion of advances to assets is not significantly related to the 
change in the proportion of small business loans to assets in columns (2) and (5).  We 
find no evidence for the portfolio substitution effect hypothesis for large or small banks.  
The financial crisis that began in 2007 created a liquidity shock that negatively 
affected the supply of credit.  Figure 1 displays aggregate small business lending by year.  
Small business lending steadily increased prior to the crisis and then declined sharply 
after the onset before leveling off in the final years of our sample.  The contraction in 
lending to small businesses during the recession made funding for these loans even more 
critical.  We therefore split the sample into two time periods, 2001-2007  and 2008-
2014, and re-estimate Eq. (1) to examine the effects of FHLB advances on small business 
lending pre- and post-recession.  Columns (1), (3), (4), and (6) of Table 5 show support 
for the asset growth hypothesis in both time periods because advances are positively 
related to the amount of small business lending.   
However, evidence of the portfolio substitution effect hypothesis differs by time 
period.  As shown in column (2), prior to the recession there is a positive relation (p-
value of 0.08) between the change in the proportion of advances to assets and small 
business loans to assets suggesting that as banks funded more assets with advances they 
increased small business lending more than other types of assets.  We find no such 
support for the portfolio substitution effect hypothesis after the onset of the recession.  
Column (5) of Table 5 shows an insignificant relation between the change in the 
advances to assets ratio and the change in the small business loans to assets ratio during 
2008-2014.  Combined with the results in Columns (4) and (5), this suggests that after 
the beginning of the recession banks still used advances to fund small business loans, but 
they did not show a preference to fund small business loans proportionately more than 
other types of assets.   
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Table 4. FHLB Advances and Small Business Lending for Large and Small Banks 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 106,062 firm year observations taken from the June 30th bank level 
Reports of Condition and Income from 2001 to 2014.  All estimates are obtained from fixed-effects regressions of Eq. 
(1) with standard errors clustered at the bank level.  Large banks are defined to have greater than $1 billion in total 
assets.  The dependent variable is the percent change in small business loans (PCSBL), the change in the small business 
loans to total assets ratio (Δ(SBL/TA)), and the natural logarithm of small business loans (Ln(SBL)) in columns (1) and 
(4), (2) and (5), and (3) and (6) respectively.  The primary independent variable of interest is the percent change in 
FHLB advances (PC(FHLB)), the change in the advances to total assets ratio (Δ(FHLB/TA)), and the natural logarithm 
of advances (Ln(FHLB)) in columns (1) and (4), (2) and (5), and (3) and (6) respectively.  All control variables are 
lagged one year.  Control variables scaled by total assets include: total equity (Equity/TA), nonperforming loans and 
leases (NPL/TA), net income (Net Income/TA), liquid assets (Liquid Assets/TA), core deposits (Core Deposits/TA), and 
mortgage loans (Mortgages/TA).  Other control variables include: the ratio of business loan commitments to total credit 
(B Commitments/TC), the natural logarithm of total assets (Ln(TA)), and a dummy variable equal to one if a bank has 
been in operation for less than five years (De Novo).  The construction of all variables is defined in Table A1.  
Coefficients for the constant term and year and bank dummy variables are not displayed to conserve space.  P-values 
are displayed in brackets below the coefficients.  Asterisks indicate statistical significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 
0.10 (*) levels.  An F-Test confirms the overall validity of the model at better than the 1% level in each specification.   
Explanatory 
Variables 
Dependent Variable 
                          Large Banks                                                                Small Banks 
      (1)  
PC(SBL) 
      (2) 
Δ(SBL/TA) 
    (3) 
Ln(SBL) 
     (4)  
PC(SBL) 
      (5) 
Δ(SBL/TA) 
    (6) 
Ln(SBL) 
PC(FHLB) 0.0451*** 
[<0.001] 
  0.0372*** 
[<0.001] 
  
Δ(FHLB/TA)  -0.0162 
[0.137] 
  0.0075 
[0.275] 
 
Ln(FHLB)   0.0398*** 
[0.002] 
  0.0248*** 
[<0.001] 
SBL/TA -2.2937*** 
[<0.001] 
-0.5506*** 
[<0.001] 
4.3683*** 
[<0.001] 
-1.7030*** 
[<0.001] 
-0.4857*** 
[<0.001] 
3.0383*** 
[<0.001] 
Equity/TA -0.1540 
[0.565] 
0.0707 
[0.168] 
-0.8503 
[0.364] 
-0.1388 
[0.210] 
-0.0232** 
[0.011] 
0.5272*** 
[<0.001] 
NPL/TA -1.7252*** 
[<0.001] 
0.0663 
[0.238] 
-1.8448*** 
[0.002] 
-1.7186*** 
[<0.001] 
-0.1574*** 
[<0.001] 
-2.5535*** 
[<0.001] 
Net Income/TA 1.3066* 
[0.075] 
0.0535 
[0.504] 
0.4789 
[0.783] 
1.0751*** 
[0.006] 
-0.2793*** 
[<0.001] 
-2.3585*** 
[0.001] 
Liquid Assets/TA -0.1579* 
[0.065] 
-0.0254** 
[0.017] 
-0.6428** 
[0.032] 
-0.1297*** 
[<0.001] 
-0.0198*** 
[<0.001] 
-.4724*** 
[<0.001] 
Core Deposits/TA -0.0070 
[0.924] 
-0.0117 
[0.467] 
-0.1000 
[0.601] 
-0.0208 
[0.325] 
-0.0031 
[0.327] 
0.0487 
[0.148] 
B 
Commitments/TC 
0.3431* 
[0.063] 
-0.0251** 
[0.033] 
-0.4075 
[0.348] 
0.3597*** 
[<0.001] 
0.0172** 
[0.034] 
0.5074*** 
[<0.001] 
Ln(TA) -0.1505*** 
[<0.001] 
-0.0016 
[0.542] 
0.5316*** 
[<0.001] 
-0.1930*** 
[<0.001] 
-0.0157*** 
[<0.001] 
0.6570*** 
[<0.001] 
Mortgages/TA 0.0620 
[0.654] 
-0.0009 
[0.937] 
0.1768 
[0.700] 
-0.0395 
[0.400] 
-0.0288*** 
[<0.001] 
-0.2441*** 
[0.003] 
De Novo 0.0578 
[0.340] 
-0.0080 
[0.188] 
-0.0054 
[0.964] 
0.0762*** 
[<0.001] 
0.0094*** 
[<0.001] 
0.0272** 
[0.024] 
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Table 5. FHLB Advances and Small Business Lending Pre- and Post- 2007 Recession 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 106,062 firm year observations taken from the June 30th bank level 
Reports of Condition and Income from 2001 to 2014.  All estimates are obtained from fixed-effects regressions of Eq. 
(1) with standard errors clustered at the bank level.  The dependent variable is the percent change in small business 
loans (PCSBL), the change in the small business loans to total assets ratio (Δ(SBL/TA)), and the natural logarithm of 
small business loans (Ln(SBL)) in columns (1) and (4), (2) and (5), and (3) and (6) respectively.  The primary 
independent variable of interest is the percent change in FHLB advances (PC(FHLB)), the change in the advances to 
total assets ratio (Δ(FHLB/TA)), and the natural logarithm of advances (Ln(FHLB)) in columns (1) and (4), (2) and 
(5), and (3) and (6) respectively.  All control variables are lagged one year.  Control variables scaled by total assets 
include: total equity (Equity/TA), nonperforming loans and leases (NPL/TA), net income (Net Income/TA), liquid 
assets (Liquid Assets/TA), core deposits (Core Deposits/TA), and mortgage loans (Mortgages/TA).  Other control variables 
include: the ratio of business loan commitments to total credit (B Commitments/TC), the natural logarithm of total 
assets (Ln(TA)), and a dummy variable equal to one if a bank has been in operation for less than five years (De Novo).  
The construction of all variables is defined in Table A1.  Coefficients for the constant term and year and bank dummy 
variables are not displayed to conserve space.  P-values are displayed in brackets below the coefficients.  Asterisks 
indicate statistical significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels.  An F-Test confirms the overall validity of 
the model at better than the 1% level in each specification.   
Explanatory 
Variables 
Dependent Variable 
                             2001-2007                                                                      2008-2014 
         (1)  
PC(SBL) 
      (2) 
Δ(SBL/TA) 
    (3 
Ln(SBL) 
     (4)  
PC(SBL) 
      (5) 
Δ(SBL/TA) 
    (6) 
Ln(SBL) 
PC(FHLB) 0.0380*** 
[<0.001] 
  0.0342*** 
[<0.001] 
  
Δ(FHLB/TA)  0.0158* 
[0.080] 
  0.0108 
[0.167] 
 
Ln(FHLB)   0.0367*** 
[<0.001] 
  0.0245*** 
[<0.001] 
SBL/TA -2.5330*** 
[<0.001] 
-0.6866*** 
[<0.001] 
1.7650*** 
[<0.001] 
-2.6356*** 
[<0.001] 
-0.6612*** 
[<0.001] 
1.8146*** 
[<0.001] 
Equity/TA -.2986 
[0.103] 
-0.0355** 
[0.023] 
-0.0289 
[0.891] 
0.3940*** 
[0.008] 
-0.0151 
[0.167] 
0.4437*** 
[0.004] 
NPL/TA -2.4342*** 
[<0.001] 
-0.1856*** 
[<0.001] 
-1.9707*** 
[<0.001] 
-1.0302*** 
[<0.001] 
-0.0434*** 
[0.003] 
-1.5768*** 
[<0.001] 
Net Income/TA -1.1591 
[0.249] 
-0.2979*** 
[0.004] 
-3.1348* 
[0.074] 
1.2262*** 
[0.001] 
-0.1122** 
[0.014] 
-0.5042 
[0.413] 
Liquid Assets/TA -0.0869 
[0.111] 
-0.0163** 
[0.016] 
-0.4638*** 
[<0.001] 
-0.2308*** 
[<0.001] 
-0.0357*** 
[<0.001] 
-0.6977*** 
[<0.001] 
Core Deposits/TA 0.0010 
[0.981] 
0.0038 
[0.513] 
0.1367*** 
[0.007] 
-0.0663** 
[0.038] 
-0.0140*** 
[0.001] 
-0.0685 
[0.116] 
B 
Commitments/TC 
0.2160** 
[0.023] 
-0.0096 
[0.469] 
0.2764** 
[0.030] 
0.4168*** 
[<0.001] 
0.0292*** 
[0.004] 
0.3012 
[0.189] 
Ln(TA) -0.3108*** 
[<0.001] 
-0.0278*** 
[<0.001] 
0.4265*** 
[<0.001] 
-0.1844*** 
[<0.001] 
-0.0048*** 
[0.006] 
0.6148*** 
[<0.001] 
Mortgages/TA -0.0239 
[0.747] 
-0.0233** 
[0.017] 
-0.3673*** 
[0.003] 
-0.2033*** 
[0.001] 
-0.0552*** 
[<0.001] 
-0.5335*** 
[<0.001] 
De Novo 0.0624*** 
[<0.001] 
0.0161*** 
[<0.001] 
0.0108 
[0.552] 
0.0188 
[0.144] 
0.0001 
[0.972] 
-0.0460*** 
[0.003] 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
Adequate credit for small businesses is an important public policy issue because 
small businesses are important sources of employment and economic growth for the 
economy (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2007).  It is generally 
recognized that depository financial institutions are important providers of credit to 
small businesses and several federal programs exist to support financial institutions in 
their role as lenders to small businesses (for example, the Small Business Administration).  
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 includes a somewhat obscure provision that could 
potentially support commercial banks in the provision of credit to small businesses 
through the use of advances from the Federal Home Loan Bank system secured by small 
business loans.  The exact intent of this legislation is not clear, but the dramatic increase 
in the size and importance of the FHLB system offers the possibility that FHLB advances 
to depository institutions might be an important source of credit for small businesses.  
Furthermore, given the recent state of the U. S. economy, the need to provide financing 
to small businesses seems an even larger public policy issue.  The original intent of FHLB 
advances was to support housing finance but the Gramm- Leach-Bliley Act provided the 
pathway for FHLB financing of small businesses through the banking system.  Our 
analysis explores the relation between FHLB advances to financial institutions and the 
provision of loans to small businesses. 
We find evidence of a positive link between the change in FHLB advances and 
the change in small business loans and the amount of FHLB advances and the amount 
of small business loans.  This relation holds for large and small banks and pre- and post-
2007 recession.  We interpret our results to support the asset growth hypothesis of Craig 
and Thomson (2003). 
We also investigate the possibility that the higher the proportion of FHLB 
advances in the total funding of a financial institution, the higher the proportion of small 
business loans in the institution’s asset portfolio.  In other words, do financial institutions 
rearrange their asset portfolios to include more loans to small businesses as a result of 
using a greater proportion of FHLB advances?  In most specifications, we find no 
evidence for this portfolio substitution effect, consistent with the proposition of Frame, 
Hancock, and Passmore (2007) that FHLB advances are one of many sources of 
wholesale funds available to financial institutions, and they will be invested in the most 
attractive financial assets available with no preference for any particular asset.  However, 
when we split the sample by time we find a positive relation between the change in the 
Davidson & Simpson  FHLB Advances and Small Business Lending 
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advances to assets ratio and the change in the small business loans to assets ratio in the 
years 2001-2007.   
We know that FHLB advances to depository financial institutions have increased 
in recent time periods.  However, it was not clear if this funding was being directed 
towards the new mission of funding small businesses.  We conclude that funding from 
advances is being used to support small business lending.  Our evidence suggests that if 
the FHLB wishes to increase its support of small business lending, focusing on providing 
funds to banks during periods of contracting credit is especially important. 
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